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Abstract
The present paper—taking the example of the English translation of the Hungarian 
Civil Code of 2013—aims to give an overview on the legal and terminology-related 
challenges and pitfalls that might occur during the process of translating a civil code 
with civil law traditions into the language of the common law world. An attempt 
is made to categorise terminology-related conceptual problems and elaborate how 
the different types of translation methods (functional equivalence, paraphrasing and 
neologism) could be applied; moreover, how a kind of legal-linguistic checks-and-
balances can be achieved through the well-dosed combination, having also the ratio 
of similarities to differences (SD-ratio or SD-relationship) of legal concepts behind 
the respective terms in mind. Legal translators must act beyond the role of a simple 
translator: they must be comparatists, being aware of the legal origin of the relevant 
concepts and using the methods of comparative private law and translation studies 
at the same time, since both law and language are system-bound and are heavily 
influenced by the cultural and social environment. The authors strive to identify the 
significance of those problems (and possible solutions) from the perspective of how 
language-related aspects can perform some fine-tuning on the comparative method-
ology and findings, whether they are barriers only or provide also an opportunity to 
verify or refute prima facie comparative results. Comparative law—no doubt—sup-
ports legal translation, but their relationship is reciprocal: legal-linguistic subjects 
and problems emerging in the course of legal translation supply valuable feedback 
and further sources of inspiration.
Keywords Lingua franca · Legal translation · Functionalist approach · 
Paraphrasing · Neologism · Civil code
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Legal systems, the legislation of which is drafted and enacted in a language, which 
is less widely used and understood, suffer from isolation as they cannot be directly 
accessed by legal practitioners or scholars from other countries. Therefore, the vari-
ous legal solutions of these legal systems can hardly be perceived as models and 
cannot easily be transplanted into other legal systems and, in the same way, their 
legal concepts can hardly if ever receive any international feedback or reflections. 
For that—and if these legal systems with “exotic” languages do not want to drop 
out of the international academic community—they must be explained in the legal 
literature in another language and/or translated into a lingua franca. The most effi-
cient way is most probably to have a combination of both. The lingua franca of law 
and of any other sciences today is definitely English. As Grosswald Curran points 
out: “English has gained ascendancy, if not dominance, with international exchanges 
in a field increasingly conducted solely in that single language, whether in scholarly 
conferences, in journals targeting an international readership, or in university classes 
where professors and students do not share a native language.” [1: 682] “Efforts to 
reverse or even halt the trend to use English, to the extent they still are being made, 
seem to be as ineffective as efforts to defend any one language from foreign importa-
tions within it.” [1: 698] As far as law and jurisprudence are concerned, this is the 
language in which international commercial contracts are drafted, international trade 
works and most international agreements are drawn up. It is therefore self-evident 
that if national legislation is to be translated, it should be into English.
Translation—and let’s quote again Grosswald Curran—is “both de-coding and re-
coding, identifying and constructing meaning.” However, by no means all associa-
tions of a word in one language can be transposed into the other; therefore a loss of 
connotative significance cannot be avoided. “As best, translation achieves an overlap 
of some meanings between two domains, as in an intersection of sets, but not total 
overlap, as in a union of sets.” [1: 685] This stands even more true and is not without 
challenges as far as translating legislation is concerned, especially in the field of 
private law, where considerable differences exist between legal systems, above all 
between those that belong to common law traditions and those that are part of the 
civil law world. The difficulty of translating a civil code of a country with civil law 
traditions into English lies in the challenge of expressing concepts of civil law in a 
language with a legal vocabulary that is intimately connected to common law. Of 
course such an exercise is not without precedents; several civil codes have already 
been successfully translated into English and the English translation of the German 
BGB1 or that of the Swiss Civil Code (Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch, ZGB2) and 
Law of Obligations (Obligationenrecht, OR3) can serve as a source of inspiration 
for other countries coping with the difficulty of expressing certain concepts of their 
1 A translation provided by Iuris GmbH as a service provided by the Federal Ministry of Justice, avail-
able at https ://www.geset ze-im-inter net.de/engli sch_bgb/engli sch_bgb.pdf.
2 Act No. SR 210, available at the governmental portal: https ://www.admin .ch/opc/en/class ified -compi 
latio n/19070 042/20180 10100 00/210.pdf.
3 Act No. SR 220, available at the governmental portal: https ://www.admin .ch/opc/en/class ified -compi 
latio n/19110 009/20170 40100 00/220.pdf.
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private law in English. However, each country must go its own way in this process, 
in which translators and legal revisers must clearly act beyond the role of a transla-
tor: they must be comparatists, being aware of the legal origin of the relevant con-
cepts of the code and using the methods of comparative private law and translation 
studies at the same time with the same ease [2: 75–76]. That was reinforced by the 
experience of drafting a publicly available English version of the new Hungarian 
Civil Code (HCC),4 an exercise undertaken under the auspices of a comprehensive 
translation project managed by the Hungarian Ministry of Justice in order to make 
the most important pieces of the national legislation accessible in English.5
This paper will make an attempt to categorise terminology-related conceptual 
problems in this exercise and explain how the different types of translation meth-
ods (functional equivalence, paraphrasing and neologism) could be applied. The 
authors have the ambition of going beyond the discovery of the primary goals of 
legal translation and to identify the significance of those conceptual problems (and 
possible solutions) from the comparative law perspective: how language-related 
aspects can carry out some fine-tuning on the comparative methodology and find-
ings, and whether they are barriers only or provide also an opportunity to verify or 
refute prima facie results.
1  On the difficulties of legal translation in general
The difficulties immanent to the translation of legal texts (legislation, contracts, 
judicial decisions) have always been in the focus of both translation studies and legal 
research. Harvey has even described it by referring to several other authors as the 
“ultimate linguistic challenge”, with regard to which the real difficulty of translation 
actually lies in the need to combine the “inventiveness of literary translation with 
the terminological precision of technical translation” [3: 177]. Legal translation is 
indeed mostly influenced by the fact that both law and language are system-bound 
and are heavily influenced by the cultural and social environment in which they 
function. Moreover, a single natural language can serve as the language of several 
legal systems at the same time—some of them not even belonging to the same legal 
family—thereby multiplying the legal languages expressed through the same natural 
language. In addition, with the proliferation of international documents and espe-
cially with the emergence of European Union law, these legal languages (and before 
all their vocabulary) must be able to express new system-specific legal concepts or 
conceive and interpret existing legal concepts in a different, supranational context 
and level. Thus, legal languages still remain system-bound, but bound to not only a 
single but more than one system.
It is due to these specificities that de Groot maintains that, in legal translation, full 
equivalence can never be achieved between the concepts of different legal systems 
but only approximate equivalence, which however should suffice for the purposes 
4 Act V of 2013 on the Civil Code (entered into force on 15th March 2014).
5 Available at: http://njt.hu/njt.php?trans lated .
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of legal translation [4: 228]. Similarly, Šarčević submits, with the aim of redefin-
ing the goal of legal translation, that “the translator should strive to produce a text 
that is equal in meaning and effect with the other parallel texts, whereby the main 
emphasis is on effect” [5: 72]. However, Fischer urges that this classical approach to 
legal translation be fine-tuned when she underlines that, with globalization and vari-
ous attempts to unify legal provisions, it is no longer true that legal translation only 
occurs in relation to two distinct legal systems and the conceptual frame in which 
they operate [6: 70, 176].
Legal translation is however in itself a complex process and is strongly influ-
enced by several factors, such as the nature of the legal text to be translated, the 
purpose of the translation and the identity of the source and the target language. 
Therefore, there have been several attempts to establish categories for the different 
types of legal translation. Cao’s classification is based on the well-known categories 
Kelsen uses in his work, the General Theory of Law and State6 identifying prescrip-
tive and descriptive—in other words performative and informative—legal texts [8: 
10]. Cao establishes three larger categories of legal translation: the translation of 
private legal documents, the translation of domestic legislation and that of interna-
tional legal instruments. In each category, translation might pursue performative or 
informative purposes. The translation of a contract, which should be binding in sev-
eral languages, should be considered as a translation of private law documents with 
performative purposes while the translation of a marriage or birth certificate has 
an informative purpose. Similarly, if domestic legislation is official in several lan-
guages, the purpose of the legal translation is performative, while in all other cases 
the translation of national legislation can only have informative goals. The same dis-
tinction is drawn in the case of those international agreements that are authentic and 
binding in several languages and those translated for informative purposes only [9: 
5–7]. Whether the translation of a legal text is for informative or performative pur-
poses can have an impact on the usefulness of the various translation methods and 
thereby on the choice of which one shall be preferred: in the case of informative 
texts, paraphrasing or descriptive methods can be more easily used while for per-
formative texts the terms used should be put in a simple but precise way by avoiding 
lengthy explanations.
The difficulty of the translation process itself depends strongly on the remoteness 
of the source legal system from the legal system, the language of which will be used 
as target language throughout the translation and on the proximity of the languages 
themselves [4: 229]. Equivalence in terminology in the case of closely-related legal 
systems will certainly be more approximate or even full [8: 9] while equivalence is 
hardly achievable when translating legislation of a civil law-based legal system with 
a non-Germanic language into a language that is typically the language of common 
law.
6 According to Kelsen “The legal norms enacted by the law creating authorities are prescriptive; the 
rules of law formulated by the science of law are descriptive” [7: 459]. In German he calls a prescriptive 
sentence a Norm and a descriptive sentence a Rechtssatz.
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However, it should be noted that English as a legal language has undergone sub-
stantial neutralization during the past decades while it became the language of vari-
ous international documents, the drafting language of international business con-
tracts and one of the official languages of the European Union, and therefore it is 
less system-bound than any other legal language and already uses terminology dis-
tinct from common law in certain areas. Moreover, some authors call this tendency 
a kind of modification beyond neutralization in the form of new words beyond the 
boundaries of the common law context “spawned by concepts of civilian origin” [1: 
698].
2  The recourse to traditional and non‑traditional translation 
methods in the case of the Hungarian Civil Code
The translation of the HCC into English should be classified as a translation with 
informative purposes into a language that is the official language of common law 
legal systems but at the same time an evolving legal lingua franca. In the course of 
such an exercise, the most essential element is to have a coherent approach towards 
establishing equivalence in terminology by trying to point out differences and simi-
larities between legal concepts in the source language and in the target language. In 
that regard, a noteworthy new method has been proposed by Matulewska, known 
as parametric theory, based on the characterization of legal translation reality and 
translational objects and relations functioning in such a reality with the help of elab-
orating potential dimensions (parameters) specifying a space for an examination of 
the translation reality [10: 12]. In a comprehensive study, Matulewska selected rel-
evant legal terminology from the Polish Civil Code and Civil Procedural Code and, 
with the help of parametrization, she aimed to establish fully and partially equiva-
lent terms in six other languages [10: 15].
During the translation process of the HCC, no such specific method was used 
for finding terminological equivalents but the relevant terms (approximately 1100 
terms) were selected and examined individually in the light of the classical trans-
lation methods—identifying functional equivalents, paraphrasing or creating neolo-
gisms—whereby the best applicable and suited method was applied depending on 
the origin, context, historical and conceptual background of the term.
Moreover, regard had to be taken of the fact that the HCC is embedded in the 
entire bulk of Hungarian legislation, and as such it utters terms that are not pure 
civil law terms but stem from other legal acts adopted in neighbouring fields of law. 
Therefore, the establishing and safeguarding interdisciplinary coherence had to be a 
compulsory aspect of the translation exercise and accompanying research work.
It should still be stressed that the nature of the source text (being a legislative act) 
excluded the recourse to alternative methods, such as giving more detailed explana-
tions in footnotes or by another way on the various aspects—such as relevant case-
law, doctrinal interpretation—of certain legal institutions specific to the Hungarian 
legal system, as the translation had to respect the textual integrity of the original 
code.
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Below, we will illustrate with examples chosen from the selected 1100 terms of 
the HCC what kind of considerations had to be assessed and balanced when having 
had recourse to the various translation methods, in which cases the individual meth-
ods proved to be successful and when should they be set aside.
2.1  Functionalist approach
When following the functionalist approach, the translator seeks to identify the term 
of the target legal language that is most fit to express the concept of the source legal 
system. Such an exercise presupposes the knowledge of the legal systems concerned 
and compared in order to find the equivalent. However, as de Groot very correctly 
points out, it is almost impossible to find full equivalents if the source legal sys-
tem and the legal system of the target language differ substantially [4: 229]. Even 
basic concepts of the law which, according to their core function, are identical might 
show substantial differences. A contract to be formed in a common law country 
would always require consideration, while in civil law systems no such requirement 
appears. However, there would be no reason to translate a Vertrag in German law 
otherwise than contract, as the essential function of both concepts—that is to have 
a mutual and enforceable agreement between the parties—is the same. As Šarčević 
submits, the closest functional equivalents should be used in legal translation if any 
differences in concepts are not decisive [5: 237–238]. Should major differences be 
identified, however, the use of presumed equivalents is risky, as it can trigger errone-
ous associations and interpretations. If there is no exact equivalent, the expressions 
concerned cannot be translated but rendered by means of approximation. The more 
differences can be identified, the more lengthy explanations were needed to avoid 
a misleading impression of similarity to the readers’ own legal system. However, 
(translated) legal texts hardly if ever tolerate “an encyclopaedic volume of explana-
tions in the footnotes.” [1: 684].
In order to deal with equivalents properly, the translator must, above all, be aware 
of where the legal concepts of the source legal system come from: are they trans-
plants of concepts of an influent legal system, have they been inspired by interna-
tionally agreed model rules or are they concepts peculiar to the source legal system? 
The choice of words must be made in the light of these findings. This is what was 
done for those terms of the HCC for which functional equivalents could be found. 
Throughout this exercise, the origin and the traditional roots of the relevant concept 
had to be identified properly in order to avoid an eventual mismatch with presumed 
functional equivalents, while in other cases a significant overlap in core functions 
was deemed to be sufficient in order to favour functional equivalents to neologisms. 
The examples below illustrate cases where functional equivalents were picked for 
the purpose of translation.
Unjust enrichment under common law was, for instance, not considered an appro-
priate equivalent of the Hungarian jogalap nélküli gazdagodás,7 a concept derived 
7 Title XXXII (Unjustified Enrichment) of Book 6 (Law of Obligations).
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from the German ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung based on the Roman law concept 
of condictiones (sine causa) but mixed with the idea of restitution [11]. The com-
mon law concept is, by name, completely independent from the existence of a causa 
but instead requires the claimant to point to a particular unjust factor or grounds 
for restitution, while the Hungarian concept refers to the lack of a valid and law-
ful legal title [12: 234]. Moreover, the English concept seems to be broader. It is 
often argued, for instance, that in English law almost all restitution claims are based 
on unjust enrichment while the German type of unjustified enrichment is only one 
amongst several models allowing restitution as remedy [13: 13–19]. In that regard, 
unjust enrichment appeared as a false friend and the correct translation was found to 
be a formulation that expresses the difference from the common law concept. Hence, 
the term unjustified enrichment—widely used in the legal literature [14]—was cho-
sen as an appropriate translation, despite the fact that in international documents or 
available translations of national laws unjust enrichment is often used as an approxi-
mate functional pair for the German-type legal institution.8 In this case the endeav-
our of the translators of the HCC was to avoid imperfect matches and underline sub-
stantial functional differences.
On the contrary, the concept of előreláthatóság in the HCC, delimiting the 
boundaries of damages in the case of a breach of contractual obligations,9 was 
explicitly borrowed from common law and international documents, which trans-
planted it [15: 85–111]. Here, no other term than foreseeability could have been 
used in the English translation. Linguistically correct versions, such as predictabil-
ity, would have been misleading and legally meaningless. This stands true, despite 
the fact that common law traditionally uses foreseeability in the area of tort law 
and originally uttered another (or parallel) term in the field of contractual damages 
instead, called “reasonable contemplation” [16: 1809]. However, when transplanted 
to international instruments of harmonisation in the field of contract law, the term 
“foreseeability” was chosen by all the drafters. The concept was clearly inspired by 
the common law model, even if it does not completely overlap with it [17: 17]. As 
the Hungarian concept is a legal transplant based on one of the above international 
instruments, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods (CISG), the choice of the term was dictated by the transplantation itself. 
A peculiar feature of the Hungarian system is that the new HCC is not only using 
előreláthatóság (foreseeability) in the field of contractual damages but also with 
regard to extracontractual liability10 and therefore, from a linguistic and conceptual 
8 See the English translation of the BGB (Sections  812–822, cf. https ://www.geset ze-im-inter net.de/
engli sch_bgb/), of the ZGB (Arts 62-67, cf. https ://www.admin .ch/opc/en/class ified -compi latio n/19070 
042/index .html) or the English version of the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
2016, p 371. (https ://www.unidr oit.org/instr ument s/comme rcial -contr acts/unidr oit-princ iples -2016).
9 Section  6:143 Para 2 HCC: “Other damage to the assets of the obligee and the loss of profit that 
occurred as a consequence of the breach of contract shall be compensated for to the extent the obligee 
proves that the damage, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract, was foreseeable at the time 
of concluding the contract.” (Emphasis added.).
10 Section 6:521 HCC: “No causal link shall be established in connection with any damage which the 
person causing it could not foresee and should not have foreseen.” (Emphasis added.).
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point of view, the translation of the same term used in the two different contexts had 
to coincide.
The above two examples show that recourse to the well-established common law 
vocabulary depends on the origin, role and similarity in function and purpose: cer-
tain terms must be avoided while others appear as the only acceptable equivalents.
Moreover, the already available English language vocabulary is not even in itself 
perfectly uniform. The question immediately emerges of which legal system should 
serve as the basis of comparison if English is the target language: that of the United 
Kingdom, that of the US or Australia or the legal language used in international 
or European instruments of harmonisation, the English version of the civil law of 
Québec or the English used in informative translations of the civil codes of civil 
law countries? As the purpose of the translation process in this particular case was 
to provide general information on the Hungarian rules in private law, the audience 
targeted by the translation was not primary a common law-educated circle but an 
international legal community. Therefore—where applicable—international docu-
ments, such as the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL),11 the Unidroit 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts,12 the United Nations Conven-
tion on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG),13 and the Draft Com-
mon Frame of Reference (DCFR)14—could be used as a source of inspiration. Rules 
with a background of international conventions (with special regard to international 
trade) and soft laws are likely to be accepted more easily anyway and with a bigger 
prospect of success, because they were negotiated amongst many countries to meet 
their needs with the involvement of other organizations, actors and stakeholders, and 
represent acceptable compromises. Terms used therein are more widespread and 
known for the same reason [18: 485]. As with international documents, so could the 
semi-official translations of civil law-based legal systems, such as the English ver-
sion of the (German) BGB and the (Swiss) ZGB and OR, be used as another source 
of inspiration.
Given the fact that most of the international instruments aiming to set com-
monly agreed and accepted legal rules emerged in the field of contract law, certain 
concepts of the contract law of civil law countries have already been introduced to 
the international legal community through a commonly agreed, mostly artificial 
name, which—even if not widely used—was at least known to legal practitioners 
and academics around the world. Therefore, it was quite evident that in these areas 
this consensus-based terminology should be followed throughout the translation of 
Book 6 (Law of Obligations) of the HCC. This way early performance,15 modified 
15 See DCFR IIII-2.103, PECL 7:103.
11 Available at: https ://www.trans -lex.org/40020 0/_/pecl/.
12 Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Unidroit, 2016, Rome. Available at: https 
://www.unidr oit.org/instr ument s/comme rcial -contr acts/unidr oit-princ iples -2016.
13 Available at: https ://www.uncit ral.org/pdf/engli sh/texts /sales /cisg/V1056 997-CISG-e-book.pdf.
14 Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft Common Frame of Refer-
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acceptance,16 agency without authority,17 restoration of the previous/original situa-
tion,18 and good faith and fair dealing19 could easily be used in order to exhibit the 
appropriate concepts of Hungarian contract law. Likewise, in the case of specific 
legal institutions that exist in some other legal orders but do not have equivalents in 
common law or have not been used in international instruments, the terms used in 
the English translation of the national codes of those other countries familiar with 
the concept could serve as an option. The German Werkvertrag, the subject-mat-
ter of which is either the production or alteration of a thing or another result to be 
achieved by work or by a service20 and which is not known in the common law as 
such a specific type of contract and is not regulated in international instruments, was 
translated in the German version of the BGB as contract to produce a work. As the 
Hungarian vállalkozási szerződés should be seen as a functional equivalent of the 
German Werkvertrag21 the English translation of the BGB was used in the Hungar-
ian translation.
Solutions to be found in the translations of national civil codes gain an even 
greater importance in areas lacking international harmonisation attempts. Given 
the similarities between the German and Hungarian law of succession, the English 
translation of the relevant terminology of the BGB could be taken over to indicate 
legal institutions having the same objective or purpose. Thus, the terms compulsory 
share, renunciation of inheritance, and testamentary disposition are used appropri-
ately in the English version of the HCC.
These translations can also work as source of inspiration for deciding upon 
the use of approximate equivalents of common law terminology in specific cases. 
Although it was questioned in the legal literature whether the German term Gegen-
leistung could be properly rendered with the English term consideration not being 
able to express the essence of the original concept lying in the dichotomy of service 
and counter-service [19], the English translation of the BGB opted for considera-
tion22 and preferred to use an approximate, not perfectly matching equivalent instead 
of an artificially created term. For the translation of the HCC, in which ellenszolgál-
tatás is a mirror translation of Gegenleistung with same central significance as in 
German law, using consideration and following the German translation seemed to 
be a logical choice. Nevertheless, it shall not be ignored that the term and concept 
of consideration in English law has a much broader and deeper meaning than just 
something given in return. Unless a promise is made by deed, contractual liability 
16 See DCFR II-4:208, PECL 2:208, Unidroit Principles 2.1.11.
17 See the English translation of the BGB (Sections 677–687: Agency without specific authorisation) or 
the OR (Arts 419-424: Agency without authority).
18 See the Comments on VI-6:101 DCFR, p. 3559.
19 See DCFR I-1:03, PECL 1:102.
20 Section 631 of the BGB.
21 Section 6:238 of the HCC provides that “Under a contract to produce a work, the contractor shall cre-
ate a result (hereinafter “work”) by performing certain activities, and the client shall accept it and pay the 
contractor’s fee.”.
22 See for before all Section  316 of the BGB on the specification of consideration (Bestimmung der 
Gegenleistung).
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and enforceability is only incurred when “such undertakings are part of an interlock-
ing exchange in which each party’s promise or performance is the agreed equiva-
lent and inducing cause of the other’s” [9: 209]. In other words, the existence of an 
enforceable obligation depends on consideration. Some rough-and-ready rules are 
connected thereto: consideration must have some economic value in the eyes of the 
law, i.e. it shall be sufficient but not necessarily adequate; consideration must move 
from the promisee (plaintiff) and must be some detriment to the plaintiff or some 
benefit to the defendant23 [20: 97, 21: 69–70]. Emphasis is put on reciprocity [21: 
67], because this is the best justification for the contract’s expectation remedies and 
the limited excuses for non-performance; moreover, it must be explicitly required 
(in the form of consideration), because transactions in the market domain “lack the 
implicit reciprocity of transactions in the private domain” [22: 229]: therefore con-
sideration “is the price paid by the plaintiff for the defendant’s promise” [23: 97, 
104, 106]. That’s why consideration gives English law the notion of contract as a 
bargain [24: 118]. According to the prevailing view, there is no consideration where 
a public duty is imposed upon the promisee by law or he is bound by an already 
existing contractual duty to the promisor (past consideration is no good as consid-
eration), but there is consideration if the plaintiff is bound by an existing contractual 
duty to a third party [23: 115, 117, 137, 24: 124–125, 21: 73, 83]. Of course, the 
boundaries and functionality of consideration are not without controversies in the 
English scholarship. Atiyah criticises it for being “a technical requirement of the law 
which has little or nothing to do with the justice or desirability of enforcing a prom-
ise” [25: 185]. Though benefit, detriment or bargain are indeed taken into account 
if the enforceability of an agreement is at stake, it is however not because they fit 
into the artificial concept of consideration, but much more because they serve as 
material factors in determining “whether it is just or desirable to enforce a promise” 
[25: 187]; in sum, “consideration has been cut loose from the reasons underlying 
it, so that it almost necessarily becomes a technical and purposeless set of arbitrary 
rules” [25: 191]. There is no further or deeper analysis needed on consideration for 
the purpose of this paper, because as much has been said so far to be sufficient to 
give rise to doubts whether it was a good idea to use the term consideration in the 
English translation of civil codes of civil law jurisdictions. This indicates another 
question: how much and how deep a comparative knowledge shall be and can be 
expected from the readers of the translation and, finally, how significant is the risk 
that the closest equivalent misleads them and, for example, readers with a common 
law background may think that consideration in the German, Hungarian, etc. civil 
codes has the same significance regarding the conclusion of (enforceable) contracts 
and involves the same controversies as in English law. To our understanding, the 
translators’ hope of not having caused more confusion than if they used a neutral 
but completely artificial term is not wholly unfounded, since it tends to be part of 
23 The leading case providing a definition is Currie v Misa (1875) LR 10 Ex 153; (1875-76) LR 1 App 
Cas 554: “A valuable consideration, in the sense of the law, may consist either in some right, interest, 
profit, or benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility, given, 
suffered, or undertaken by the other.”
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lawyers’ general legal knowledge, regardless of background, that it is mutual con-
sent on which contracts (and their enforceability) are based in civil law jurisdictions 
and not whether there is anything to be given in return.
Inspired by the English translation of the ZGB, similarity in essential functions 
in civil law and common law concepts was relevant when deciding to use public 
deed for authentic documents or instruments (közokirat in Hungarian and öffentli-
che Urkunde in the German version of the Swiss law24), despite the differences in 
the establishment and production of such documents in civil law and common law 
systems.25 Using an artificial descriptive translation in this case would have been 
meaningless for the reader. Moreover, public deed seems to be commonly used 
already by other civil law jurisdictions in English language legal books, papers and 
translations.26
It is with the same purpose and endeavour that the term juridical act, intro-
duced and used as a core term of the DCFR27 for statements or agreements, whether 
express or implied from conduct, which are intended to have legal effect as such, 
was taken over to the English translation of the HCC, despite the fact that the juridi-
cal act of the DCFR seems to be broader than the Hungarian term.28
As demonstrated, functional equivalents of common law terminology might 
prove adequate if the essential functions of the concepts are identical and the con-
text makes the non-essential characteristics clear while, in the case of transplants 
of common law concepts, the use of functional equivalents is a must. At the same 
time, English terms devised at national or international level in order to exhibit civil 
law concepts can and, in the interest of making this vocabulary uniform and wide-
spread, should be followed in new translations of civil codes. As explained and seen 
regarding the triangle of ellenszolgáltatás, Gegenleistung and consideration, the use 
of the closest equivalent may and can sometimes be considered the least worst solu-
tion, even if it is quite far from the term to be translated and from the concept of the 
language of the origin to be reflected in the target language; and even if the scope of 
the latter is significantly broader and denser than the term in the language of origin, 
since the lack of understanding may be more misleading and confusing than some 
misunderstanding based on the conceptual (common law) background of the term 
used in the target language.
28 Section 6:4 paragraph (4) of the HCC foresees an explicit reservation concerning silence or abstention 
from a certain conduct, which shall only qualify as a juridical act if the parties expressly provided so. No 
similar express reservation is to be found in the DCFR. That minor difference does not however question 
the equivalence of the two concepts as far as their essential characteristics are concerned.
24 See for example Arts 9, 81, 184 B, 195a G, 337 B, etc. ZGB.
25 In UK law, public deed has a much a narrower meaning than it does have in civil law systems. This 
can be explained by the fact that civil law type “notarial deeds” do not exist in the common law coun-
tries, where the function of public notaries is limited to ascertaining the identity of the person signing a 
document or taking that person’s sworn statement [26].
26 See also the semi-official English language version of the Spanish Civil Code at http://derec hociv il-
ugr.es/attac hment s/artic le/45/spani sh-civil -code.pdf (Arts 103, 198, 317, 540, 541, 633, 703, etc.).
27 Book II (Contracts and other juridical acts), Article I:101 (2).
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2.2  Paraphrasing
Paraphrasing is a useful means of avoiding mismatches of remote functional equiva-
lents or conceptual false friends by describing the given legal institution. Paraphras-
ing is thus driven by precision, and the descriptive method might help to explain the 
essential characteristics of the concept. However, this advantage appears at the same 
time a disadvantage, because the descriptive formulation might sound alien in the 
whole body of the law and might burden the text. Nevertheless, using the method of 
paraphrasing can still draw the readers’ attention to the “otherness” and can moti-
vate the reader to look for further sources that reveal the content and the exact mean-
ing of the respective rule, principle or legal institution. The bigger the gap between 
the content and meaning of the original term and of the “closest” equivalent in the 
other language, the more reasonable it is to switch to the technique of paraphras-
ing, unless the use of the closest equivalent equals the least worst solution for some 
particular reason inherent in the respective terms and concepts (see, for example, 
“consideration” above).
In the translation process of the HCC, paraphrasing was only used if the rele-
vant term seemed to be non-translatable or if it was important to avoid a functional 
mismatch.
This descriptive method was successfully used in the introductory provisions of 
the HCC in the case of Section 1:1, aiming to define the scope of the Act and the 
main principles of private law that must be observed throughout the application and 
interpretation of the Code. The translation of the principle of equality (egyenlőség 
elve in Hungarian) did not pose major difficulties but the other principle, aiming to 
underline not only the equality but also the lack of interdependence and the same 
level-based status of the actors in private law (mellérendeltség elve in Hungarian) 
did not have a well-elaborated perfectly matching equivalent in other legal systems. 
Therefore, the descriptive method was used and the term mellérendeltség, which 
means juxtaposition literally, was translated as non-subordination. Thus, the Eng-
lish version of the very first provision of the HCC provides “This Act governs the 
property and personal relations of persons in accordance with the principles of non-
subordination and equality.”
Paraphrasing was also partly used in order to distinguish the different forms of 
the dissolution of a contract. Section 6:212 regulates the dissolution of the contract 
by mutual agreement of the parties: they might dissolve the contact for the future (ex 
nunc) or rescind it with retroactive effect (ex tunc). Section 6:213 foresees the par-
allel legal effects in the case of unilateral juridical acts of the parties: if cancelled, 
the rules on rescission apply; if, however, unilaterally terminated, the contract is 
dissolved for the future. In this context dissolution, cancellation and rescission are 
existing legal terms of English (common law) private law, but unilateral termina-
tion (i.e. adding and emphasising unilateral) is a paraphrase in order to underline 
the independent aspect of this form of dissolution (the other party’s consent is not 
needed to dissolve the contract), which the term termination would not have been 
able to express on its own (i.e. without the addendum unilateral).
No method other than paraphrasing was advisable to be used in the case of the 
Hungarian transplant of trust which—unlike its common law parent concept—had 
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to be envisaged under Hungarian law as a type of contract (bizalmi vagyonkezelési 
szerződés). As the original Hungarian term is already a paraphrasing, the 
English translation had to reflect this alteration and acculturation of the transplant 
by indicating it as fiduciary asset management contract. The origin of the trans-
plant is however still reflected by the names used for the parties of the contract: 
the settlor and the trustee and the things, rights and obligations transferred to 
the trustee (trust property). The use of the term fiduciary asset management con-
tract can be perceived also as an exclamation mark, drawing the reader’s atten-
tion to the conceptual and structural differences between the “classic” common 
law concept of trust and the civil law counterpart. In the Roman law-based civil 
law jurisdictions the unity of ownership prevails; the simultaneous existence of 
a legal and an equitable title (i.e. horizontally divided, dual or split ownership) 
does not and cannot exist [27: 1190, 1193, 1215]. Therefore, paraphrasing (and 
avoiding the use of the term trust) can have a secondary function, to support the 
correct interpretation of the respective rules and to assist in resisting the tempta-
tion to project any common law characteristic to the fiduciary asset management 
contract. In this way, the significance of translations can go beyond their primary 
function (making a legal text accessible to non-natives) inasmuch as conclusions 
can be drawn from a translation (why the term was translated exactly in a way 
as it was and what does this reveal about the meaning and/or on the distinction 
of the term from other legal institutions and false friends) regarding the content 
and merit of the respective rule, even in domestic use (the so-called blowback-
effect of translation in domestic interpretation of the translated rule). Having this 
in mind, the use of the terms settlor and trustee seems to be prima facie contra-
dictory, since it seems to push the respective phenomenon back towards the com-
mon law approach and to cause confusion on the legal nature of the type of con-
tract in question. However, trust as a legal term in a broader sense goes beyond 
the notion in the narrow sense referring to the common law approach defined by 
equitable ownership. The former also covers different legal instruments (i.e. civil 
law adaptations) “that fulfil the function of property management” for someone 
else [27: 1189], i.e. that include the separation of assets from the trustee’s own 
property and other property managed (and owned also in his or her capacity as 
trustee of other settlors); the recognition of rights for the beneficiary against any 
third persons “in the case of gratuitous transfer of property or its acquisition with 
bad faith” corresponding to the common law concept of tracing; and, last but not 
least, the restrictions and limitations of the trustee’s rights to manage the prop-
erty but not being allowed to dispose of it for any other purpose. The civil law 
adaptability of the trust’s functions shows that the common law approach on hori-
zontally divided ownership is not a precondition of the trust’s functional essence 
[27: 1193–1194, 1211, 1215–1216]. To our understanding, the translators of the 
Hungarian Civil Code chose the right approach: again, the use of the paraphrase 
fiduciary asset management contract serves as an exclamation mark, warning 
the reader that the respective type of contract itself differs substantially from 
the common law fundaments of trust, thus the reader will not be misled into the 
common law concept of trust. After this semiotic red-line, it makes sense to stop 
paraphrasing and to remind the reader of the functional similarities by calling the 
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parties settlor, trustee and beneficiary. When the translator opted for the use of 
these terms, he or she did not refer to the common law trust, but to the broad and 
international meaning of the term.
2.3  Neologism
Neologism means the artificial creation of a new term in the target language that 
would obviously not have a fixed meaning therein, and so it is perfectly suited to 
expressing the special nature of the concept of the source legal system, which lacks 
approximate equivalents in the target legal language. The novelty of the term will 
prevent eventual confusion with existing legal concepts of the target legal language 
but at the same time—unlike paraphrasing—it will not reveal anything about the 
substance and nature of the legal institution concerned. (In this way, neologism is 
not very different from leaving the term in the source language.) While there is no 
doubt that a neologism does not transmit the concept behind the term, it still indi-
cates that “the concept at issue is foreign and without exact equivalence” [1: 684].
Some neologisms in the English legal language expressing concepts of civil 
law are already well accepted due to harmonisation and globalisation, such as the 
terms legal person (instead of earlier used nominations of juridical person or legal 
entity),29 personality rights (instead of the common law equivalents rights of public-
ity and/or rights of privacy),30 and therefore, when translating the HCC, those con-
cepts that are peculiar to the Hungarian private law were primarily considered for 
potential neologisms, either traditional or newly created ones. Subject of law, a per-
son who has rights and obligations under the law, is such a neologism.
Title IX of Book 7 (Law of Succession) of the HCC regulates lineal inheritance 
and, within Section 7:67, deals with lineal property.31 Both concepts are specific to 
the Hungarian law of succession rooted in old customary traditions [28] with the 
aim of ascertaining that assets passed to the deceased person from one of his ances-
tors through succession or gifting shall be subject to lineal inheritance (that is to 
say inherited by the parents or their descendants and not by the spouse or registered 
partner) if the intestate heir is not a descendant of the deceased. The English terms 
29 See the definition of “Person” in the Annex to the DCFR or I-1:105, IV-3:201 (2), X-5:204 (2). Legal 
person has become a commonly used term of EU law as well.
30 In the DCFR, see under page 63 (Protection of a person) a person’s right to physical wellbeing and the 
right of dignity are mentioned among personality rights. Personality rights are furthermore enumerated 
in the definition list of Rights as a right to respect for dignity, or a right to liberty and privacy. On the ori-
gin of the concept of right of privacy and personality rights see [28].
31 Section 7:67 [Lineal property]
(1) If the intestate heir is not a descendant of the testator, the assets passed to the testator from one of his 
ascendants through succession or gifting shall be subject to lineal inheritance.
(2) Lineal inheritance shall apply to assets inherited or gifted from a sibling or a descendant of a sibling 
if the asset was inherited by or gifted to the sibling or the descendant of the sibling from an ascendant he 
shared with the testator.
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used for the relevant Hungarian concepts (ági öröklés, ági vagyon) had therefore to 
be artificially created.
An artificial term was created for the newly introduced form of compensation—
called sérelemdíj and translated finally as grievance award—that replaced the for-
mer concept of non-material (or non-pecuniary) damages in the event of any breach 
of personality rights, because the concept of non-pecuniary damages in the former 
civil code was very much stressed by inherent contradictions. That’s why the legis-
lator decided to replace it with sérelemdíj, always to be paid in a lump sum (thus, 
no annuity, i.e. periodical payment is possible), which is conditional on any per-
sonality right infringement (personality rights are covered by a general clause in 
Section 2:4232 and by a non-exhaustive list in Section 2:4333HCC; new personality 
rights can be and continuously are identified in case law). According to this new 
concept, however (and in contrast with the former approach on non-pecuniary dam-
ages), no proof of any (immaterial) disadvantage or loss has to be provided beyond 
the infringement of a personality right.34 Section 2:52 Para 3 contains the factors 
the judge will consider while deciding on the amount, generally at their free discre-
tion. These are as follows: the circumstances of the case, in particular the gravity 
of the violation, whether it was committed on one or several occasions, the degree 
of fault, and the impact of the violation on the aggrieved party and his environ-
ment. This grievance award can be claimed personally only; the claim cannot be 
inherited, unless the lawsuit is already filed with the court when the injured party 
passes away. Though the Hungarian sérelemdíj is a parent concept of the German 
or Austrian Schmerzen(s)geld, it is not identical to it therefore the English terms 
artificially invented and created for that concept (smart money,35 compensation 
32 Section 2:42 [General protection of personality rights]
(1) Everyone shall have the right, subject to limitations by law and by the rights of others, to exercise his 
personality rights freely, in particular the right to respect for his private and family life, his home, and 
to his communications made by whatever ways or means, and the right to good reputation and not to be 
hindered by anyone from exercising these rights.
(2) Everyone shall respect human dignity and the personality rights derived from it. Personality rights 
are protected by this Act.
(3) A conduct to which the person concerned has given his consent shall not violate personality rights.
33 Section 2:43 [Specific personality rights] Violation of personality rights means in particular
a) harm to life, physical integrity and health;
b) violation of personal liberty and privacy, and trespass;
c) discrimination against a person;
d) defamation or violation of good reputation;
e) violation of the right to keep personal secrets and the right to the protection of personal data;
f) violation of the right to a name;
g) violation of the right to the protection of one’s image and recorded voice.
34 This seems to be contradictory to some extent with the wording of Section 2:52 Para 1 HCC, accord-
ing to which non-material harm must have been caused to the victim: “Any person whose personality 
rights have been violated may claim a grievance award for non-material harm done to him.” The Advi-
sory Council on the New Civil Code besides the Curia (i.e. the highest court in Hungary) is of the view 
that no grievance award shall be awarded in the absence of any perceptible non-material harm, cf. the 
published opinion of the Advisory Body: https://kuria-birosag.hu/hu/ptk?tid%5B%5D=344&body_
value=.
35 Smart-money is used as an equivalent in the English-German, German-English Dictionary of Law and 
Business Terminology published in 1929 by v. Beseler [30].
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and satisfaction36) would also have been neologisms (even if already existing ones) 
but, given the substantial differences with their counterparts, at the same time 
misleading.
As far as the German and the Hungarian concept is concerned, there are differ-
ences both at the structural level and regarding some important details. While the 
Hungarian approach focuses on personality rights and on their infringements and 
the legislator created a presumption that personality right infringements do cause 
non-material harms to the victims (personality right approach), both the German 
and the Austrian concepts highlight the non-pecuniary losses (non-pecuniary dam-
ages approach). For example, Section 253 Para 1 of the German BGB clarifies that 
“Money may be demanded in compensation for any damage that is not pecuniary 
loss only in the cases stipulated by law.” Such a law follows directly after, in Para 
2 of the same Section, stating: “If damages are to be paid for an injury to body, 
health, freedom or sexual self-determination, reasonable compensation in money 
may also be demanded for any damage that is not pecuniary.” While the Hungar-
ian rule is quite open by contrast, reasonable compensation under German law can 
only be claimed if the specified protected goods were infringed and this caused non-
pecuniary loss, harm or damage to the victim. The burden of proof lies with the 
plaintiff [31: 21, 30]. (The BGB does not even use the expression Schmerzensgeld, 
though this is widespread in case law and scholarly writings). The same stands true 
for the Austrian General Civil Code (ABGB): its Section 1325 makes it clear that 
Schmerzengeld can be claimed only if the victim suffered personal (bodily) injury 
(Körperverletzung).37 Although the German case law developed an autonomous and 
independent claim for Schmerzensgeld based on Arts 1 and 2 Grundgesetz (Funda-
mental Law, i.e. the Constitution) in connection with Section  823 Para 1 BGB on 
extracontractual liability with reference, in case law, to the infringement of the so-
called allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht (general personality right), but not even this 
is as flexible and wide open as the Hungarian counterpart, because under the constant 
case law in Germany, the personality right infringement must be grave and shall not 
be able to be eliminated or outbalanced by other types of claims, such as injunction, 
counter-order, right of reply, pecuniary damages, etc. (principle of subsidiarity) [31: 
26–27, 32: 294–295, 311–312]. In sum, the German approach is much more restric-
tive. As far as the details are concerned—having regard to case law, i.e. to the law 
in action—there are also some significant differences. Though in all three legal sys-
tems the judge can establish the amount generally at his or her free discretion having 
the criteria specified in the civil code or developed in case law in mind (always with 
special regard to the circumstances of the particular case), in Austria and Germany, 
non-binding Schmerzensgeldtabellen (charts based on earlier published judgments) 
36 See in the legal literature van Dam, Markesinis et al [33, 34].
37 “Wer jemanden an seinem Körper verletzet, bestreitet die Heilungskosten des Verletzten; ersetzet ihm 
den entgangenen, oder wenn der Beschädigte zum Erwerb unfähig wird, auch den künftig entgehenden 
Verdienst und bezahlt ihm auf Verlangen überdieß ein den erhobenen Umständen angemessenes Schmer-
zengeld.” Section 1328 contains a similar provision on (the infringement of) sexual self-determination, 
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are continuously published and referred to in proviso jurisprudence and in litigation. 
Though the commentaries in both countries underline that the judges shall (must) 
not use these guidelines in a mechanical way and they always have to keep an eye 
on the circumstances of the particular case, the Schmerzensgeldtabellen nevertheless 
contribute significantly to the everyday predominance of the principle that similar 
injuries deserve similar amount of Schmerzensgeld and to the predictability of the 
law [31: 36–37, 35: 27, 30]. In Austria, for example, the daily amounts are adjusted to 
the gravity of the pain: i.e. they are different as far as light, intermediate, strong and 
excruciating pain and suffering is concerned [36: 30, 37: 72, 38: 33, 39: 117]. There 
are no such or similar published guidelines in Hungary. Though lump sum compensa-
tion is the rule in the two countries referred to here, in contrast with the Hungarian 
law, periodic payment (annuity) is not excluded provided this is in line with victim’s 
best interest due to the longevity, gravity and/or irreversibility of the pain and suf-
fering he or she is exposed to (for example paraplegia) or to the unpredictability of 
the (non-material) consequences of the injuries. [31: 57–59, 36: 34, 38: 37, 39: 121]. 
Again in contrast with the recent Hungarian recodification, both German and Aus-
trian laws allow the heirs to enforce the claim (in Germany, the one based on Sec-
tion 253 BGB but not the other one based on the infringement of the general person-
ality right), even if the victim had not filed the lawsuit yet when he or she died [31: 
65, 32: 296, 36: 35, 37: 91, 38: 31, 39: 123]. The scope of the common law term pain 
and suffering is basically also restricted to the consequences of personal injuries. To 
be more precise, there are two types of non-pecuniary losses resulting from personal 
injuries to be compensated in English law: on the one hand pain and suffering, and on 
the other hand loss of amenity. Pain and suffering cover “pain, distress, anxiety and 
suffering experienced by the victim, but not sorrow or grief” [40: 21]. Consequently, 
pain and suffering does not fit into the broad concept of the Hungarian sérelemdíj 
either, which covers all kinds of personality right infringements, including but not 
limited to personal injuries, to the violation of privacy, good reputation and honour, 
to discrimination, to the unlawful use of someone’s image and recorded voice, etc. 
In addition, it should be stressed that legal scholars have warned of translating the 
German Schmerzensgeld as compensation for pain and suffering, as even the German 
concept is broader in encompassing other common law headings of damage, such as 
loss of amenity, disfigurement and loss of expectation of life [34: 198]. Since nei-
ther the approximate counterpart in English law, nor the German and Austrian con-
cepts (and their translation) are equal to the Hungarian model, a new term, grievance 
award, was artificially created and inserted into the English version of the HCC.
Whether neologism will succeed and will be effectively used in legal practice and 
literature is a matter of time. It seems, for instance, that earlier attempts to call Hun-
garian legal persons established for the pursuit of business-like activities business 
associations38 failed in practice, and in business relations and in legal practice the 
use of the closest functional equivalent of companies was preferred, despite the fact 
38 It should however be noted that the term “business association” is not a completely artificial one. In 
some common law countries (mainly in the US and in Africa [41]) it is used as a general term to cover 
all forms of business-like activities in a very broad sense without referring to or willing to encompass 
specific types of business forms. On the other hand, the Hungarian term “gazdasági társaság” is specific 
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that the concept of company in UK law definitely does not cover all types of existing 
Hungarian forms. General partnerships or limited partnerships under Hungarian law 
for instance would not count as a company under UK law, given the fact that these 
forms—similar to UK partnerships—are essentially based on the internal informal-
ity of their members as partners [42: 305] and, unlike private or public companies 
limited by shares, they cannot function with a single member. In the UK, companies 
and partnerships (even those with limited liability and being recognised as a legal 
entity) are clearly distinctly treated categories, regulated in different parliamentary 
acts39 without an umbrella term that would cover all of them, while the HCC treats 
both of these entities under a single, rigid and specific cover-category (gazdasági 
társaság).40 The Hungarian translation finally chose to follow the practice and used 
the closest functional equivalent of companies, instead of the earlier term business 
associations, which could not be accommodated. This approach is fully in line with 
what Šarčević submits: approximate equivalents should—if possible and they are 
not misleading—be favoured over neologisms [5: 262]. However, as referred to 
above, there are no perfect equivalents; there are more-or-less equivalents only. The 
difficult question is to identify the borders, when and to what extent the differences 
are so significant that they outweigh the similarities, and the use of the “false-equiv-
alent” would result in misleading the reader and their misunderstanding of the text. 
If the border is crossed, paraphrasing or even neologism must be preferred.
3  Conclusions
The primary goals of translation of civil codes drafted in internationally less-used 
languages into a lingua franca (i.e. making their content accessible to academics 
and practitioners from other legal systems) are manifold. It facilitates mutual under-
standing regarding the legal background of cross-border business, including but not 
limited to the choice of those laws under private international law, since people are 
only scared of those things that they do not know or understand. Having the new 
Hungarian Civil Code translated increases the chances of obtaining substantive 
reflection from abroad, i.e. from the international academic community. The closer 
the respective legal systems are regarding the language and the merits, the easier it 
is to reproduce a civil code in the target language and to keep the original meaning 
as much as possible. Another general finding is that the more the target language is 
neutralised and internationalized (i.e. became detached from the own legal system, 
whether due to the legal harmonization within the EU or the result of having already 
drafted international treaties and/or soft laws using the target language as a lingua 
franca), the easier it is to perform the translation to this language.
The results of the translation project and research reported on in this paper how-
ever reveal some deeper and more substantial correlations. They shed light again 
Footnote 38 (continued)
and precise in being a cover term for four well-identified types of legal entities pursuing business activi-
ties.
39 See the Company Act 2006, the Partnership Act 1890 and the Limited Liability Partnership Act 2000.
40 See Part III (Companies) of Book 3 (Legal Persons) of the HCC.
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and again on the embeddedness of the law in the language and vice versa: on the 
embeddedness of the (legal) terms in the law; in other words, on their interwoven 
and interdependent cohesion. Separation of the wording from the context of cul-
ture and language necessarily results in distortions to a certain extent regarding the 
meaning and/or to misunderstandings or even not understanding the translated text. 
The interdependence of law and language might be seen as a barrier as far as the pri-
mary goals of translation are concerned; nevertheless, it can serve as a valuable tool 
for comparatists in fine-tuning their findings.
Whether the use of the closest (functional) equivalent, paraphrasing or creat-
ing a neologism is opted for depends generally on the ratio of similarities to differ-
ences (hereinafter referred to as SD-ratio or SD-relationship) between the rules and 
concepts behind the respective terms, which should not be understood in a purely 
mathematical or numerical sense. It does not necessarily depend on any frequencies 
either. Whether the similarities outweigh the differences or vice versa depends on 
many factors, thus the “big picture” matters. The complexity of legal matters and 
considerations, policies, etc. behind them cannot be shaped using mathematical for-
mulae. A rough guideline is that if the use of the closest functional equivalent results 
in creating a false friend that misleads the international readership on the content, 
i.e. if the differences outweigh—if at a structural level in particular—then it is advis-
able not to cross this red line and to decide to paraphrase or use a neologism. How-
ever, the use of a well-known and hardly if ever replaceable term can sometimes 
still be the least worst solution, despite significant conceptual differences between 
the contents of the terms in the respective languages and, in the same way, between 
the respective legal systems (see for example “consideration” above). Having this in 
mind, the experiences of legal translations can support comparative analyses in at 
least two aspects. First, they serve as a control mechanism, as a kind of language-
oriented double-check of the hypotheses. Second, they channel and catalyse the 
comparative analyses themselves, since they enforce the evaluation of similarities 
and differences in statutory law and beyond.
No doubt, using the closest (functional) equivalent indicates that there are more 
similarities than differences, while paraphrasing and neologisms draw the readers’ 
attention to the differences, i.e. to the “otherness” of the translated rule(s). In that 
sense, functional equivalents reveal more on the merits compared to the other two 
techniques. Legal translation offers the opportunity to create a kind of “checks and 
balances of legal terminology” in combining several methods if, and as far as, nec-
essary. First, a principal and substantive decision is to be made with regard to the 
SD-ratio at a structural level, and then the overall picture can be fine-tuned with 
the other tools. That’s what happened to the Hungarian version of trust, to be more 
precise: to the fiduciary asset management contract. Due to the overwhelming struc-
tural differences between the common law concept of horizontally divided property 
and the continental European versions of managing property for others, the trans-
lator opted—correctly—for paraphrasing, which created a presumption of dissimi-
larities and warns the readership not to expect the genuine Anglo-Saxon concept of 
trust from that contract. However, after this clearly accented caution, the original 
(equivalent) English terms are used with reference to the parties and to their con-
tracting positions (settlor, trustee, beneficiary), which adds a soft and quiet counter 
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of similarity to the big choir and orchestra of differences within the polyphonic har-
mony of legal translation. The overall picture enables the international reader (with 
some legal background knowledge) to understand that fiduciary asset management 
contract is no trust in a common law sense, but, since the contracting parties and 
their positions are pinpointed by well-known English terms, this type of agreement 
serves the same goals, but in a civil law-conform manner.
Acknowledgements  Open access funding provided by Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE).
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article 
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the 
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is 
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission 
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen 
ses/by/4.0/.
References
 1. Curran, Vivien Grosswald. 2019. Comparative Law and Language. In The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law, ed. Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann, 681–708. Oxford: OUP.
 2. Gémar, Jean-Claude. 2006. What Legal Translation is and is not – Within or Outside the EU. In 
Pozzo, Barabara and Jacometti, Valentina (eds.) Multilingualism and the Harmonisation of Euro-
pean Law. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 69–77.
 3. Harvey, Malcolm. 2002. What’s so Special about Legal Translation? Meta: Translators’ Journal. 
Vol. 47. No. 2. 177–185.
 4. De Groot, Géraud-René. 2002. Rechtsvergleichung als Kerntätigkeit bei der Übersetzung juris-
tischer Terminologie. In Sprache und Recht, ed. Ulrike Hass-Zumkehr, 222–239. Berlin: de Gruyter.
 5. Šarčević, Susana. 1997. New Approach to Legal Translation. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
 6. Fischer, Márta. 2010. A fordító, mint terminológus, különös tekintettel az európai uniós kontextusra. 
Thesis. ELTE BTK
 7. Kelsen, Hans. 2009. General Theory of Law and State. New Brunwsick, London: Transaction 
Publishers.
 8. Bednárova-Gibov, Klaudia. 2014. EU Discourse as a Textual, Legal and Linguistic Challenge. 
Filológia 1–4: 4–17.
 9. Cao, Deborah. 2007. Translating Law. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
 10. Matulewska, Aleksandra. 2017. Contrastive Parametric Study of Legal Terminology in Polish and 
English. Contact: Studies in Legal Language and Communication. Poznan.
 11. Jansen, Nils. 2016. Farewell to Unjustified Enrichment? Available at SSRN: https ://ssrn.com/abstr 
act=27403 22, available also in The Edinburgh Law Review 20.2 (2016): 123-148.
 12. Menyhárd, Attila. 2014. Unjustified Enrichment in the New Hungarian Civil Code. ELTE Law Jour-
nal 2: 233–245.
 13. Dannemann, Gerhard. 2009. The German Law of Unjustified Enrichment and Restitution. Oxford: 
OUP.
 14. Giglio, Francesco. 2003. A Systematic Approach to ’Unjust’ or ’Unjustified’ Enrichment. Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 3: 455–482.
 15. Fuglinszky, Ádám. 2015. The Reform of Contractual Liability in the New Hungarian Civil Code: 
Strict Liability and Foreseeability Clauses as Legal Transplants. Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
und internationales Privatrecht, (79) No. 1, 72-116.
 16. Beale, H.G. 2012. Chitty on Contracts. 31st ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell.
769
1 3
Language‑bound terms—term‑bound languages: the difficulties…
 17. Csöndes, Mónika. 2014. A szerződésszegési jog előreláthatósági korlátjának joggazdaságtani mod-
ellje és annak kritikája. Állam- és Jogtudomány 1: 3–35.
 18. Cowan, Rosaline Baindu. 2013. The Effect of Transplanting Legislation from one Jurisdiction to 
Another. Commonwealth Law Bulletin. 39(3): 479–485.
 19. Goddard, Christopher. 2009. Where Legal Cultures Meet: Translating Confrontation into Coexist-
ence. Investigationes Linguisticae XVII: 168–205.
 20. Beale, H.G., W. Bishop, and M.P. Furmston. 2008. Contract Cases and Materials. 5th ed. Oxford: 
OUP.
 21. Mckendrick, Ewan. 2009. Contract Law. 8th ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
 22. Chen-Wishart, Mindy. 2013. In Defence of Consideration. Oxford University Commonwealth Law 
Journal 13(1): 209–238.
 23. Furmston, M.P. 2007. Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract. 15th ed. Oxford: OUP.
 24. Cartwright, John. 2007. An Introduction to the English Law of Contract for the Civil Lawyer. 
Oxford and Portland: Hart.
 25. Atiyah, P.S. 1986 (reprinted in 2001). Essays on Contract. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
 26. Rossini, Christine. 1998. English as a Legal Language. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
 27. Sándor, István. 2016. Different Types of Trust from an Ownership Aspect. European Review of Pri-
vate Law 6: 1189–1216.
 28. Strömholm, Stig. 1967. Rights of Privacy and Rights of the Personality. Stockholm: Instituti Upsali-
ensis Iurisprudentiae Comparativae.
 29. Homoki-Nagy, Mária. 2000. A törvényes öröklés jogi szabályozása 1861-ig. Acta Universitatis Sze-
gediensis: Acta juridica et politica. 52: 212–230.
 30. von Beseler, Dora. 1929. English-German, German-English Dictionary of Law and Business Termi-
nology. Berlin, Leipzig: de Gruyter.
 31. Oetker. Hartmut. 2019. § 253 BGB. In Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (8 ed. – online version; 
references pinpoint marginal numbers).
 32. Rixecker. Roland. 2019. Anhang zu § 12 BGB. In Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (8 ed. – online 
version; references pinpoint to marginal numbers).
 33. Van Dam, Clees. 2013. European Tort Law. Oxford: OUP.
 34. Markesinis, Basil, Michael Coester, Guido Alpa, and Augustus Ullstein. 2005. Compensation for 
Personal Injury in English, German and Italian Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 35. Spindler. 2019. § 253. In Beck Online Kommentar – Bamberger/Roth/Hau/Poseck (51 ed. – online 
version Stand 01. 08. 2019.).
 36. Danzl. 2017. § 1325 ABGB. In Koziol, Bydlinski, and Bollenberger (eds.) ABGB Kurzkommentar. 
5 ed. Wien: Verlag Österreich - references pinpoint marginal numbers.
 37. Harrer-Wagner. 2016. § 1325 ABGB. In Schwimann and Kodek (eds.) ABGB Praxiskommentar 
Band 6 . 4 ed. Online Version – Stand März 2016 - references pinpoint marginal numbers.
 38. Hinteregger. 2018. § 1325 ABGB. In Kletečka/Schauer ABGB Online Kommentar – Version 1.04 
(Stand 1. 4. 2018, drb.at - references pinpoint marginal numbers).
 39. Huber. 2017. § 1325 ABGB. In Schwimann and Neumayr (eds.) ABGB Taschenkommentar (4 ed.). 
Online Version, Stand Oktober 2017 references pinpoint marginal numbers.
 40. Karapanou, Vaia. 2014. Towards a Better Assessment of Pain and Suffering Damages for Personal 
Injuries. A Proposal Based on Quality Adjusted Life Years. Cambridge: Intersentia.
 41. Chungu, Chanda. 2019. The Law of Business Associations in Zambia. Cape Town: Juta.
 42. Morse, Geoffry. 2010. Partnership Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.




 Réka Somssich 
 somssichreka@ajk.elte.hu
1 Faculty of Law, Eötvös Loránd University, 1-3 Egyetem tér, Budapest 1053, Hungary
